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Communication, consensus and order. Who wants to speak
first ? ∗
Nicolas Houy†, Lucie Ménager‡
9th January 2006
Abstract
Parikh and Krasucki [1990] showed that if rational agents communicate the value of
a function f according to a protocol upon which they have agreed beforehand, they will
eventually reach a consensus about the value of f , provided a fairness condition on the
protocol and a convexity condition on the function f . In this article, we address the issue
of how agents agree on a communication protocol in the case where they communicate
in order to learn information. We show that if it is common knowledge among a group
of agents that some of them disagree about two protocols, then the consensus value of f
must be the same according to the two protocols.
JEL Classification: D70, D82.
Keywords : Common knowledge, Consensus, Communication Protocol.
1 Introduction
Alice and Bob are sitting in front of each other, both wearing either a red hat or a white
hat. Suppose that the two hats are red. The teacher tells the children that there is at least one
red hat, and asks them whether they know the color of their hat. The two children observe
that the other’s hat is red, but cannot infer the color of their own hat. The only way for
them to answer the teacher is to communicate with each other. Suppose that Alice tells Bob
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that she does not know the color of her hat. Bob understands that his own hat is red, for if
it had been white, Alice would have known that her hat was red. Now Bob knows the color
of his hat. But then if he tells Alice that he knows the color of his hat, Alice will not learn
anything, for the message of Bob would have been the same regardless of the color of her hat.
Therefore, Alice has no interest to be the first to say whether she knows the color of her hat.
This story illustrates the following fact. From the moment that people communicate in order
to be better informed, who gets to talk when is important: the communication process is not
commutative, for different orders of speech may lead to different outcomes.
It is well known since Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982] that in a group of rational
agents, a process of simultaneous communication of posterior beliefs for an event leads to
equality of all individual beliefs. Cave [1983] and Bacharach [1985] extended this result to
simultaneous communication of decisions, assuming that the decision rule followed by agents
satisfies a union consistency property. Yet in most economic situations where agents have to
speak together, communication is not simultaneous. It is common sense that each individual
speaks one after the other according to a given protocol. Parikh and Krasucki [1990] considered
the case where agents of a group communicate with each other, according to a pairwise protocol
upon which they have agreed beforehand. They investigated what conditions on the type of
messages and on the protocol guarantee that agents eventually reach a consensus, i.e. that
from some stage on all the communicated values will be the same. They show that if the
protocol is fair, that is if every participant receives information directly or indirectly from
every other participant, and if the function f is convex, that is for all pair of disjoint events
X,X ′, there exists a ∈ [0, 1] such that f(X∪X ′) = af(X)+(1−a)f(X ′), then communication
will eventually lead to a consensus about the value of f .
We show that different protocols may lead to different outcomes, in terms of consensus
values of f as well as of information learned by the agents during the communication process.
This non-commutativity of the order of speech, as well as the fact that agents communicate
so as to be better informed, imply that they may have strategic considerations concerning the
order of speech. Depending on the state of the world, Alice and Bob may prefer to speak first
or second, or may be indifferent. If neither Alice nor Bob wants to speak first, communication
can not take place. However, can we conclude that they will not learn anything from each
other? The fact that Alice does not want to speak first is informative for Bob. Bob knows
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that if Alice knew the color of her hat, she wouldn’t mind speaking first and saying that she
knows the color of her hat. In this paper, we investigate what inferences can be made by
rational agents from the common knowledge that some of them disagree about the order of
speech.
We show that the following situations are both possible. First, it can be common knowledge
in a group of agents that some of them prefer the same order of speech. Second, it can be
common knowledge in a group of agents that some of them prefer different orders of speech.
However, we show the surprising result that if it is the case, then the consensus value of f
must be the same whatever the order of speech. For instance, if it is common knowledge
among Alice and Bob that they both want to speak first, then what they will communicate
at the end of the day will be the same, whether Alice or Bob speaks first.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and the basic result
of Parikh and Krasucki [1990]. Section 3 defines preferences over protocols and develops the
result. The proof of the theorem is given in the Appendix.
2 Preliminary notions
Let Ω be the finite set of states of the world, and 2Ω the set of possible events. There
are N agents, each agent i being endowed with a partition Πi of Ω. When the state ω ∈ Ω
occurs, agent i just knows that the true state of the world belongs to Πi(ω), which is the cell
of i’s partition that contains ω. We say that a partition Π is finer than a partition Π′ if and
only if for all ω, Π(ω) ⊆ Π′(ω) and there exists ω′ such that Π(ω′) ⊂ Π′(ω′). A partition Π′
is coarser than a partition Π if and only if Π is finer than Π′. The partition Πi represents the
ability of agent i to distinguish between the states of the world. The coarser her partition is,
the less precise her information is, in the sense that she distinguishes among fewer states of
the world. As usual, we say that an agent i endowed with a partition Πi knows the event E
at state ω if and only if Πi(ω) ⊆ E. We define the meet of the partitions Π1,Π2, . . . ,ΠN as
the finest common coarsening of these partitions, that is the finest partition M such that for
all ω ∈ Ω and for all i = 1, . . . , N , Πi(ω) ⊆M(ω).
Common knowledge of an event E at a state ω is the situation that occurs when each
agent knows E at ω, each agent knows that each of them knows E at ω, each agent knows
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that each agent knows that each agent knows... etc. Aumann [1976] showed that, given a set
of N agents, the meet M of their N partitions is the partition of common knowledge among
these N agents. Hence we say that an event E is common knowledge at state ω iff M(ω) ⊆ E.
Before communicating, agents have to agree on a communication protocol that will be
applied throughout the debate. The protocol determines which agents are allowed to speak
at each date.
Definition 1 A protocol α is a pair of functions (s, r) from N to 2{1,...,N}. If s(t) = S and
r(t) = R, then we interpret S and R as, respectively, the set of senders and the set of receivers
of the communication which takes place at time t.
We note Γ the set of protocols. Note that the type of protocols we consider are more
general than the ones in PK, for we allow for more than one agent to be senders and receivers
of the communication at the same time.
Along the debate, agents communicate by sending messages, which we assume to be de-
livered instantaneously, that is at time t, messages are simultaneously sent by every i ∈ s(t)
and heard by every j ∈ r(t). We assume that the message sent is the private value of some
function f defined from the set of subsets of Ω to R. The private value of f for an agent i at
state ω is f(Πi(ω)).
Finally, the set of states of the world Ω, the individual partitions (Πi)i, and the message
rule f define an information model I = 〈Ω, (Πi)i, f〉.
Two assumptions are made on the protocol and on the function f to guarantee that iterated
communication of the value of f leads to a consensus about f . As in PK, we assume that the
protocol is fair. We adapt PK’s definition in our setting, but the meaning remains the same:
a protocol is fair if and only if every participant in this protocol communicates directly or
indirectly with every other participant infinitely many times. This condition is necessary so
that nobody is excluded from communication.
Assumption 1 (A1) The protocol α is fair, that is for all pair of players (i, j), i 6= j, there
exists an infinite number of finite sequences t1, . . . , tK , with tk ∈ N for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
such that i ∈ s(t1) and j ∈ r(tK).
Assumption 2 (A2) f is convex, that is for all subsets E,E′ ⊆ Ω such that E ∩ E′ = ∅,
there exists α ∈]0, 1[ such that f(E ∪ E′) = αf(E) + (1− α)f(E′).
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Note that we will have f(E1 ∪ E2 ∪ · · · ∪ Ek) =
∑k
i=1 αif(Ei), with αi ∈ ]0, 1[ ∀ i and∑k
i=1 αi = 1 provided that the Ei are pairwise disjoint events. This condition is obeyed by
conditional probabilities and implies union consistency1 à la Cave [1983].
We now describe how information is aggregated during the debate. At a given date t, the
senders s(t) selected by the protocol (s, r) send a message heard by the receivers r(t). Then
each individual infers the set of states of the world that are compatible with the messages
possibly sent, and updates her partition accordingly. Given an information model 〈Ω, (Πi)i, f〉
and a communication protocol α, we define by induction on t the set Παi (ω, t) of possible states
for an agent i at time t, given that the state of the world is ω:
Παi (ω, 0) = Πi(ω) and for all t ≥ 1,
Παi (ω, t+ 1) = Π
α
i (ω, t) ∩ {ω′ ∈ Ω | f(Παj (ω′, t)) = f(Παj (ω, t)) ∀ j ∈ s(t)} if i ∈ r(t),
Παi (ω, t+ 1) = Π
α
i (ω, t) otherwise.
The next result states that for all i, for all ω, f(Παi (ω, t)) has a limiting value, and that
this value does not depend on i. Under assumptions A1 and A2, participants in the protocol
converge to a consensus about the value of f .
Proposition 1 (Parikh and Krasucki (1990)) Let 〈Ω, (Πi)i, f〉 be an information model,
and α a communication protocol. Under assumptions A1 and A2, there exists a date T such
that for all ω, for all i, j, and all t, t′ ≥ T , f(Παi (ω, t)) = f(Παj (ω, t′)).
In the sequel, we will denote Παi (ω) the limiting value of Π
α
i (ω, t), and Π
α
i will be called i’s
partition of information at consensus. f(Πα(ω)) will denote the limiting value of f(Παi (ω, t),
which does not depend on i, and will be called the consensus value of f at state ω, given that
the protocol is α.
3 Who wants to speak first?
We know from Parikh and Krasucki [1990] that given any protocol α, under assumptions
A1 and A2, iterated communication of the private value of f eventually leads to a consensus
1f is union consistent if for all E,E′ such that E ∩ E′ = ∅, f(E) = f(E′)⇒ f(E ∪ E′) = f(E) = f(E′).
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about the value of f . The next proposition states that this value may vary according to the
protocol.
Proposition 2 There exist an information model 〈Ω, (Πi)i, f〉 with f convex and two fair
protocols α, β for which there exists ω such that f(Πα(ω)) 6= f(Πβ(ω)).
This result can be proved easily for some union consistent functions f . However, to the best
of our knowledge, it was not proved for conditional probabilities. As the posterior probabilities
of an event are particular union consistent function, it could have been possible that there
exist no information model with posterior probabilities such that order matters. We exhibit
an example where it does.2
Example 1 Let Ω = {1, . . . , 13} be the set of states of the world. Suppose that Alice and Bob
have a uniform prior P on Ω. They communicate in turn the private value of the function
f(.) = P ({2, 3, 4, 8, 12} | .), which is convex, and are endowed with the following partitions of
Ω3:
ΠA = {1, 3, 7, 8}1/2{2, 6, 11, 12}1/2{4, 5, 10}1/3{9}0{13}0
ΠB = {1, 3, 5}1/3{2}1{4, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13}1/3{6, 8}1/2{11}0
If Alice speaks first (protocol α), individual partitions at consensus are:
ΠαA = {1, 3, 7, 8}1/2{2}1{11}0{6, 12}1/2{4, 10}1/2{5}0{9}0{13}0
ΠαB = {1, 3}1/2{5}0{2}1{4, 10}1/2{7, 12}1/2{9, 13}0{6, 8}1/2{11}0
If Bob speaks first (protocol β), individual partitions at consensus are:
ΠβA = {1, 3, 7}1/3{8}1{2}1{6}0{11}0{12}1{4, 5, 10}1/3{9}0{13}0
ΠβB = {1, 3, 5}1/3{2}1{4, 7, 10, }1/3{12}1{9, 13}0{6}0{8}1{11}0
2We found it by a numerical search. If somebody has a similar example with less than 13 states of the
world, please tell us!
3The subscript reflects the posterior belief in each cell.
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At state 1, the consensus value of f is f({1, 3, 7, 8}) = f({1, 3}) = 1/2 if Alice speaks first,
whereas it is f({1, 3, 7}) = f({1, 3, 5}) = 1/3 if Bob speaks first.
We assume that agents communicate in order to be better informed. As a consequence,
they prefer protocols that lead them to be better informed at the end of the day. A more
precise information is represented by a finer partition. Yet two partitions may not be rankable
in the sense of refinement, so we may not be able to say with which partition an agent is better
informed. For instance, we cannot say whether an individual is better with Π = {1}{2, 3, 4}
or with Π′ = {1, 2, 3}{4}. However, we can say that one is better informed with Π than with
Π′ at state 1, and better informed with Π′ than with Π at state 4.
Definition 2 We say that an agent is better informed with the partition Πα than with the
partition Πβ at state ω if and only if Πα(ω) ⊂ Πβ(ω).
Before communication takes place, the information model 〈Ω, (Πi)i, f〉 is common knowl-
edge among individuals. Therefore, given any protocol α, consensus partitions (Παi )i are also
common knowledge. As a consequence, each agent knows ex interim which protocol she prefers
among any two orders if she’s not indifferent.
Definition 3 (Preferences) Let I := 〈Ω, (Πi)i, f〉 be an information model, and α, β two
protocols. The set of states of the world where agent i prefers α to β is denoted BIi (α, β) and
is defined by
BIi (α, β) = {ω ∈ Ω | ∀ω′ ∈ Πi(ω), Παi (ω′) ⊆ Πβi (ω′) and ∃ ω′′ ∈ Πi(ω) s.t. Παi (ω′′) ⊂ Πβi (ω′′)}
In Example 1, Alice and Bob are both better informed with the protocol α at state 4
and better informed with the protocol β at state 8. Hence at states 4 and 8, they agree on the
protocol they prefer. On the contrary, at state 1, Alice and Bob end up strictly better informed
when they speak in second. What happens in that case? Suppose that state 1 occurs, and
that Alice and Bob stand in front of each other waiting for the other to speak. Alice knows
that the state of the world belongs to {1, 3, 7, 8}. She understands that the state of the world
can not be 7 nor 8, for Bob would have spoken first at state 8 and would have been indifferent
at state 7. Bob knows that the state of the world belongs to {1, 3, 5}. He understands that
the state of the world can not be 5, for he knows that Alice prefers to speak first at state 5.
Hence knowing that the other does not want to speak first makes Alice and Bob understand
7
that the state of the world is in {1, 3}. From now, they have the same private information
at state 1. As they cannot learn information from the communication process, they become
indifferent between speaking first or second. This example addresses the question of whether
it can be common knowledge among two persons that they disagree about the order of speech.
More generally, what inferences can be made by rational agents of a group from the common
knowledge that some of them disagree about the order of speech? Our main result states that
if it is the case, then the consensus message is the same according to any protocol.
Theorem 1 Let I = 〈Ω, (Πi)i, f〉 be an information model such that A1 and A2 are satisfied,
and α, β two protocols such that α 6= β. Consider a1, a2, b1, b2 ∈ {α, β}, with a1 6= a2 and
b1 6= b2. Assertions (1), (2) and (3) cannot be true simultaneously.
(1) ∃ i, j such that BIi (a1, a2) and BIj (b1, b2) are common knowledge at ω.
(2) ω ∈ BIi (a1, a2) ∩BIj (b1, b2) and a1 = b2.
(3) f(Πα(ω)) 6= f(Πβ(ω)).
The meaning of this result is the following.
• If (1) and (2) are true, namely if it is common knowledge at some state ω that Alice
and Bob prefer to speak first, then (3) is false, i.e the consensus value of f at ω is the same
regardless of the person who speaks first.
• If (1) and (3) are true, namely if it is common knowledge at ω that Alice prefers a1 ∈
{α, β} and Bob prefers b1 ∈ {α, β}, and if the consensus value of f differs according to whether
the protocol is α or β, then (2) is false, i.e Alice and Bob prefer the same protocol (a1 = b1).
• If (2) and (3) are true, namely if Alice and Bob prefer different orders of speech at ω,
then (1) is false, i.e these preferences are not common knowledge among them at ω.
The result of Theorem 2 is not due to the fact that propositions (1) and (2) or (1) and (3)
or (2) and (3) are never true simultaneously.
Proposition 3 (i) Propositions (1) and (2) of Theorem 2 can be true simultaneously.
(ii) Propositions (1) and (3) of Theorem 2 can be true simultaneously.
(iii) Propositions (2) and (3) of Theorem 2 can be true simultaneously.
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This proposition states that (i) it can be common knowledge among them that Alice and
Bob prefer different orders of speech, (ii) it can be common knowledge among them that Alice
and Bob prefer the same order of speech, and (iii) it is possible that Alice and Bob prefer
different orders of speech which lead to different consensus values of f .
We prove point (i) with the following example, which describes a situation where it is
common knowledge between Alice and Bob that both of them prefer to speak in second. The
fact that both prefer to speak in second in order to be better informed is quite intuitive.
When an agent is the second to speak, the first message she hears contains purely private
information of the other. When she is the first to speak, the first message she will hear will
be a join of the other’s private information and her private information, so she may not learn
anything. However, we found another example which shows that there exist situations where
both agents prefer to speak first.4
Example 2 The set of states of the world be Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} and Alice and Bob are
endowed with a uniform prior P on Ω. They communicate in turn the private value of the
function f(.) = P ({1, 2, 7} | .) and are endowed with the following partitions:
ΠA = {1, 2}1{3, 4}0{5, 6, 7}1/3
ΠB = {1, 7}1{2, 3, 6}1/3{4, 5}0
If Alice speaks first (protocol α), individual partitions at consensus are: ΠαA = {1, 2}1{3, 4}0{5, 6}0{7}1ΠαB = {1}1{2}1{3}0{4}0{5}0{6}0{7}1
If Bob speaks first (protocol β), individual partitions at consensus are: Π
β
A = {1}1{2}1{3}0{4}0{5}0{6}0{7}1
ΠβB = {1, 7}1{2}1{3, 6}0{4, 5}0
At every state of the world, Alice and Bob both prefer to speak in second: BA(β, α) = Ω
and BB(α, β) = Ω, hence at every state of the world, it is common knowledge among Alice
and Bob that Alice prefers the order β and Bob the order α. However, it does not contradict
Theorem 2 as for all ω, f(Πα(ω)) = f(Πβ(ω)).
4Maybe because it is less intuitive, it is also pretty tedious (there are 288 states of the world), so it is
available from the authors upon request.
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We prove point (ii) with the following example, which shows that it is possible that both
agents prefer the same order of speech.
Example 3 The set of states of the world be Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} and Alice and Bob
are endowed with a uniform prior P on Ω. They communicate in turn the private value of the
function f(.) = P ({1, 6, 7, 9} | .) and are endowed with the following partitions:
ΠA = {1, 2, 4, 5, 9}2/5{3, 6, 7, 8}1/2
ΠB = {1, 3, 7}1/3{2, 5, 8}0{4, 6, 9}2/3
If Alice speaks first (protocol α), individual partitions at consensus are: ΠαA = {1}1{2, 5}0{4, 9}1/2{3, 7}1/2{6}1{8}0ΠαB = {1}1{2, 5}0{4, 9}1/2{3, 7}1/2{6}1{8}0
If Bob speaks first (protocol β), individual partitions at consensus are:
 Π
β
A = {1, 4, 9}2/3{2, 5}0{3, 6, 7}2/3{8}0
Πβ2 = {1, 3, 7}2/3{2, 5, 8}0{4, 6, 9}2/3
At every state of the world, Alice and Bob prefer that Alice speaks first: BA(α, β) =
BB(α, β) = Ω, hence it is common knowledge at any state that both prefer the order α.
Finally, we prove point (iii) with Example 1 in section 2. The partition of common
knowledge is M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13}. At state 1, Alice and Bob prefer to
speak second, and f(Πα(1)) = 1/3 6= f(Πβ(1) = 1/2. However, this is not common knowledge,
for Bob prefers to speak first at states 6 and 8.
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Proof of [Theorem 1]
Consider an information model I = 〈Ω, (Πi)i, f〉, and α, β two protocols such that α 6= β.
Let us show that if points 1) and 2) of theorem 1 are true, then point 3) is false. We show
that if there exist two agents i, j and a state ω such that BIi (α, β) and B
I
j (β, α) are common
knowledge at ω, then f(Πα(ω)) = f(Πβ(ω)). Clearly, the proof still holds if we invert α and
β.
Recall that M(ω) denotes the meet of individual partitions before communication takes
place: M =
∧n
i=1Πi. We note Π
α the meet of the individual partitions at consensus, given





If BIi (α, β) and B
I
j (β, α) are common knowledge at ω, then we have
M(ω) ⊆ Bi(α, β) ∩Bj(β, α)
As Πα(ω) ⊆ M(ω) and Πβ(ω) ⊆ M(ω) ∀ ω, we have Πα(ω) ∩ Πβ(ω) ⊆ M(ω) ∀ ω. Hence
we have
Πα(ω) ∩Πβ(ω) ⊆ BIi (α, β) ∩BIj (β, α) (1)
Consider some ω′ ∈ Πα(ω) ∩ Πβ(ω) (which is not empty as ω ∈ Πα(ω) ∩ Πβ(ω)). By
definition of the meet, we have Παi (ω
′) ⊆ Πα(ω′) and Πβi (ω′) ⊆ Πβ(ω′). As ω′ ∈ Πα(ω)∩Πβ(ω),
we have Πα(ω′) = Πα(ω) and Πβ(ω′) = Πβ(ω). Then we have
Παi (ω
′) ⊆ Πα(ω) and Πβi (ω′) ⊆ Πβ(ω) (2)
By (1), ω′ ∈ BIi (α, β). It implies that Παi (ω′) ⊆ Πβi (ω′). Yet Πβi (ω′) ⊆ Πβ(ω) by (2).
Then we have
Παi (ω
′) ⊆ Πα(ω) ∩Πβ(ω)
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By Proposition 1 of Parikh and Krasucki [1990], ∀ i, j, f(Παi (ω)) = f(Παj (ω)) for all ω. By
definition of the meet, it implies that ∀ ω′ ∈ Πα(ω), f(Παi (ω′) = f(Παi (ω)). As f is convex, it
is also union consistent, then we have f(Πα(ω) ∩Πβ(ω)) = f(Πα(ω)).
The same reasoning applied to Πβj (ω) boils down to f(Π
α(ω) ∩Πβ(ω)) = f(Πβ(ω)).
Hence f(Πα(ω)) = f(Πα(ω)) ¤
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